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Abstract 
Background: A common problem of some information technology courses is the difficulty of providing practical 
exercises. Although different approaches have been followed to solve this problem, it is still an open issue, specially in 
security and computer network courses.
Results: This paper proposes NETinVM, a tool based on nested virtualization that includes a fully functional lab, com-
prising several computers and networks, in a single virtual machine. It also analyzes and evaluates how it has been 
used in different teaching environments.
Conclusions:   The results show that this tool makes it possible to perform demos, labs and practical exercises, 
greatly appreciated by the students, that would otherwise be unfeasible. Also, its portability allows to reproduce class-
room activities, as well as the students’ autonomous work.
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Background
Security, system administration and computer networks 
are fundamental elements of information technology 
(IT) systems today, and many related courses (operat-
ing systems, computer network fundamentals, computer 
and network security, network management, etc.) are 
included in computer science graduate and postgradu-
ate degrees. A common problem that arises in all these 
courses is the difficulty of designing practical exercises.
It is widely accepted that students learn more effectively 
from courses that provide for involvement in practical 
activities (e.g., setting up a customized network, installing 
and configuring network services, testing ethical hack-
ing techniques, etc.), as shown in a wide variety of papers, 
conferences and books devoted to computer science edu-
cation (Sarkar 2006; Trabelsi and Alketbi 2013; O’Grady 
2012; Carter 2013). However, it is very difficult to design 
practical exercises that do not seriously affect the infra-
structure where these exercises are done. Operating system 
administration exercises or penetration tests are examples 
of such activities, that may be even illegal. Simulation tools 
such as Packet Tracer from Cisco (2014) could be an alter-
native to real systems. However, the complexity of simu-
lating real systems make these tools to focus on certain 
subsystems (i.e. the network), thus limiting their scope.
Virtualization techniques were proposed some years 
ago as an efficient alternative for teaching computer net-
works related courses in a secure and controlled environ-
ment (Bulbrook 2006; Gaspar et  al. 2008; Pizzonia and 
Rimondini 2008; Burd et al. 2009), and they are currently 
used in many courses (Faircloth 2011; Salah 2014; Raman 
et al. 2014). These proposals use virtualization in order to 
set up network and computer infrastructures that resem-
ble the actual ones (even in the user interface), while 
they provide the required security and isolation from the 
actual infrastructures. These tools provide users with an 
easily reproducible environment, and they allow students’ 
autonomous work. Virtualization and nested virtualiza-
tion tools have also been proposed in many education 
environments (Bower 2010; Wannous et al. 2012).
Traditionally, two different approaches have been 
used: the first one is to provide copies of virtual machine 
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images to the students so that they run them in its own 
computer, and the second one is to setup a virtual labo-
ratory using the institution’s infrastructure, providing 
students with remote access. Both of these approaches 
present some inconveniences. The first one should be 
limited to a single virtual machine in order to provide 
ease of use. Otherwise, it requires that each student 
configures its own virtual lab using several images and 
creating its own virtual network infrastructure (a non-
trivial and error-prone process, which is bounded by the 
resources of the host computer). The second approach 
requires significant investment in infrastructure 
resources, and the requirements are proportional to the 
number of students. Additionally, the availability of the 
resources cannot be guaranteed once the course finishes 
(for example, in subsequent years).
The advent of cloud computing and the increasing 
availability of web services during the last years (Mari-
nescu 2013; Amazon 2014; Google 2014) has allowed to 
go one step further, and some cloud-based virtualiza-
tion tools for online teaching have been proposed (Salah 
2014; Willems et al. 2011; Abraham 2013; Xu et al. 2014). 
Nevertheless, the deployment of cloud services adds 
some drawbacks to virtualization tools. First, the use 
of a given cloud infrastructure forces the user to learn 
and use a concrete technology and services, making the 
course dependent on a given service provider. Second, 
the number of students in a given course may require a 
cloud infrastructure size that exceeds the maximum size 
that the provider offers for free, increasing the cost of the 
course. Third, the use of cloud resources may add signifi-
cant latencies that affect the interactivity of the exercises. 
Finally, the reproducibility and usability along time is 
seriously affected, since students are not guaranteed that 
the cloud infrastructure is accessible some time after the 
course finishes (Son et al. 2012), like the second approach 
in the use of virtualization techniques described above.
In order to avoid the problems introduced by these 
approaches, this paper proposes NETinVM, a tool based 
on nested virtualization (virtual machines inside a virtual 
machine) that includes a fully functional lab in a single 
virtual machine. This lab comprises three interconnected 
networks with several computers attached to each net-
work, providing a portable and realistic scenario for 
teaching courses related to security, system administra-
tion and computer networks. The paper analyzes the use 
of NETinVM in different learning techniques [Problem-
Based Learning (PBL) and traditional Lecture-Based 
Learning (LBL)] applied to courses of different computer 
science fields. The results show that this tool allows to 
perform labs and practical exercises that would otherwise 
be unfeasible. Also, it allows to reproduce the results of 
the proposed exercises, providing portability and allow-
ing the students to work autonomously.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: “Imple-
mentation” section summarizes the implementation and 
main features of NETinVM. Next, “Results and discus-
sion” section shows the application of NETinVM to dif-
ferent learning and training environments and the results 
obtained with this tool. Finally, “Conclusions” section 
shows come conclusion remarks and future work to be 
done.
Implementation
NETinVM is a VMware virtual machine image that 
includes, ready to run, a computer network of User-Mode 
Linux (UML) virtual machines. When started, the UML 
machines form a computer network named “example.
net” whose general structure is shown in Fig. 1. This sec-
tion, describes these three basic elements (the VMware 
virtual machine, the UML virtual machines and the vir-
tual network) and how some critical infrastructure issues 
have been solved. For a detailed description, the NET-
inVM web page can be consulted (Pérez and Pérez 2014).
VMware virtual machine image
The VMware virtual machine, named Base, provides 
the base to run and monitor the UML virtual machines, 
and its fully qualified domain name is “base.example.
net”. Base includes 1 32-bit processor, 2  GB of RAM, a 
20  GB SCSI hard disk, a DVD player, 1 network inter-
face connected to VMware’s NAT network, USB con-
troller, 1 sound card, and 1 graphics card. On this virtual 
hardware, version 12.1 of openSUSE (Novell 2008) is 
executed, which provides the KDE desktop, LibreOffice 
and C/C++ development tools. Base also includes the 
tools needed to monitor the execution of UML machines, 
such as Tcpdump or Wireshark. Obviously, it also 
includes UML and the disk image used by the UML vir-
tual machines that will run in it. Even with all these tools 
installed, Base has around 13 GB of free disk space. This 
storage capacity allows to start and work with the UMLs, 
and also to install additional tools.
UML virtual machines
The UML virtual machines (UMLs) are created using 
User-Mode Linux and, depending on the network they 
are connected to, they assume different roles: corpo-
rate workstation, internal server, router, bastion node, 
external server or Internet node. Each UML has the fol-
lowing virtual hardware: 1 32-bit processor, 128  MB 
RAM, 1 GB hard drive, and 1 network interface (except 
the UML that acts as a router—labeled as “fw” in Fig. 1, 
which has 3 interfaces). All UMLs use the copy-on-write 
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technique provided by UML. Therefore, all of them ini-
tially start using the same file system, and each one writes 
his changes to a separate sparse file. In this file system the 
version 6 of Debian (2008) is installed, including appro-
priate tools for teaching networking, system administra-
tion and security topics. There are several advantages 
derived from all UML machines sharing the same root 
file system, which we call “reference file system” (RFS):
1. It saves space. Using copy-on-write, 19 UML 
machines can be running taking as little as 0.5 GB of 
Base’s disk.
2. It simplifies maintenance. Updating all UML 
machines with the latest security patches or adding a 
software package to all of them is as simple as doing 
it in one of them.
3. It simplifies its use. All UMLs are similar and have 
the same software installed.
Virtual networks
NETinVM is pre-configured to create three intercon-
nected virtual networks, playing the role of the corpo-
rate, perimeter and external networks of an organization. 
These networks are named “int” (for internal network), 
“dmz” (for DMZ or demilitarized zone, which is often 
used as a synonym for perimeter network) and “ext” (for 
external network). The networks are created using the 
“uml_switch” program included with UML. This program 
implements a virtual Ethernet hub or switch (configured 
as a hub in NETinVM). One of the UML machines, “fw” 
(for firewall), interconnects the three networks provid-
ing communication and packet filtering, as shown in 
Fig.  1. The rest of UMLs have a single network inter-
face connected to the network they are named after, 
as follows (where X can be from “a” to “f”): intX UMLs 
are connected to the internal network. These machines 
only offer the SSH service. dmzX UMLs are connected 
to the perimeter network (DMZ). They are conceived as 
bastion nodes. In this network there are two machines 
with alias. “dmza” has the alias “www.example.net” and 
it provides HTTP and HTTPS services; “dmzb” has the 
alias “ftp.example.net” and it offers FTP. Finally, extX 
UMLs are connected to networks that are external to the 
organization (e.g., “Internet”). These three networks are 
connected through base to VMware’s “vmnet8” (NAT) 
virtual network, which allows the connection of UML to 
external (real) networks.
The default gateway for the internal and perimeter net-
works (machines “intX” and “dmzX”) is “fw”, the default 
gateway for “fw” is the IP address of “base” in the “ext” 
network, and the machines on the external network 
(“extX”) have “base” as the default gateway, and “fw” as 
Fig. 1 General structure of NETinVM. Virtual machines and networks within NETinVM
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the gateway to access the perimeter and internal net-
works. “fw” applies NAT to all traffic from the inter-
nal and perimeter networks that is going out through 
its external network interface, so that these packets get 
to the external network with 10.0.0.254 as source IP 
address. Therefore, the traffic among UML machines of 
the three networks always goes through “fw”, while the 
traffic directed to machines outside “base” goes through 
“fw” if and only if it comes from the internal or the 
perimeter networks. In any case, the traffic to the out-
side world always goes through “base”, which, as “fw”, 
has also enabled IP forwarding and NAT. Communica-
tions between “base” and any UML Machine are carried 
out directly, without passing through “fw” (provided 
that the IP of “base” corresponding to the network of the 
UML machine is used). This arrangement is convenient 
because it allows access from “base” to all UML machines 
using SSH, regardless of the configuration of routing and 
packet filtering in “fw”. The UML machines can com-
municate each other via standard network protocols. All 
UML machines have the SSH service enabled by default 
and there are bastion nodes offering HTTP and FTP ser-
vices, but any other standard IP service can be also con-
figured (NFS, SMTP, ...).
The configuration of SNAT in “fw” as described above 
is necessary so that responses to outgoing connections 
to Internet originated in the internal and perimeter net-
works get back through “fw”. If SNAT were not active in 
“fw”, the responses would be sent by “base” directly to the 
UML machines, thus bypassing “fw”.
Inter‑machine communication
The UML machines can communicate each other via 
standard network protocols. All UML machines have the 
SSH service enabled by default and there are bastion nodes 
offering HTTP and FTP services, but any other standard 
IP service can be also configured (NFS, SMTP, ...).
Communications between “base” and the UML 
machines can also be carried out through the network, 
with the advantage that “base” is directly connected to 
the three subnets and, therefore, it has access to all UML 
machines regardless of the configuration of “fw”.
Also, when a UML virtual machine starts, 3 vir-
tual terminals appears in Base. In this way, the user 
can work with the UMLs even when the network is 
not operational, as if having physical access to the 
machines.
Finally, the UML machines have access to the directory 
“$HOME/uml/mntdirs/tmp” of Base using the path “/
mnt/tmp”. To set up this correspondence, it is used UML’s 
“hostfs” file system. Thus, all of the UMLs and Base share 
a directory through which they can exchange informa-
tion without network access.
Configuration of UMLs
Although sharing the same reference file system (RFS) is 
very positive, it is clearly necessary that each UML vir-
tual machine can be adapted to play different roles. For 
example, ‘fw’ has three network interfaces and performs 
packet filtering, ‘dmza’ provides HTTP and HTTPS, ‘exta’ 
only provides SSH, ...
The RFS includes one and only configuration tool, the 
script “configure.sh”, which is stored in “base” and is also 
accessible to the UMLs using the “hostfs” file system 
introduced before. When starting, every UML tries to 
run this script, whose algorithm is as follows:
1. Checks if the UML has already been configured. If so, 
it ends.
2. Marks the machine as configured.
3. Applies the default settings.
4. Applies the network specific settings.
5. Applies the machine specific settings.
The configuration (the default, network specific or 
machine specific) involves enabling services and/or exe-
cute orders. In any case, as the configuration is done only 
once per virtual machine, the changes have to be perma-
nent and stored in the machine’s filesystem. For example, 
if a service “fw” is added, symbolic links must be added to 
“/etc/rcX.d” (where X is the default run level).
This configuration mechanism has three key 
advantages:
1. Configuration (even “configure.sh” itself ) can be 
completely changed without starting any UML 
machine.
2. Once they are running (even after the first boot), 
UMLs have a standard Debian file system, since the 
only commands executed are those of the standard 
booting process.
3. Different configurations can be easily saved so that 
different exercises begin with a known different ini-
tial state.
Backup and restore
NETinVM includes a tool for creating and restoring 
backups. To save the state of all of the UMLs is enough 
to run the script “uml_backup.sh”. And, to restore a pre-
viously saved state, it is just necessary to run the script 
“uml_restore.sh”. Both utilities use the standard KDE file 
dialog to select where to store copies (“uml_backup.sh”) 
and which backup to restore (“uml_restore.sh”). The only 
requirement is that the UMLs must be stopped to per-
form a backup or restoration.
Backups are TGZ files including configuration files 
(which are small) and copy-on-write files (which are 
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sparse files that include only changes made with respect 
to the RFS). Thus, each backup usually takes some KB or, 
at most, a few MB of disk space. This makes it possible 
to perform dozens of exercises, each one with multiple 
restoration points, without consuming too much storage 
space.
Results and discussion
NETinVM has been intensively used at University of 
Valencia since 2012 for teaching courses related to secu-
rity, system administration and network planning. These 
courses are part of the degree curricula for Telematics 
Engineering and Computer Engineering and master cur-
ricula for web services, and they are based on different 
learning techniques: Problem-Based Learning (PBL) and 
traditional Lecture-Based Learning (LBL). Also, NET-
inVM has been used in other scenarios such as books and 
web-based courses. In this section, we analyze the use of 
NETinVM in all these environments.
Lecture‑based learning in a computer security course
Traditional Lecture-Based Learning, where the teacher 
makes an oral presentation intended to present the main 
concepts of the course, is usually complemented with 
exercises to be carried out by the students. This is the 
case for computer security, a mandatory course sched-
uled in the third year of both the Degree in Computer 
Engineering (DCE) the Degree in Telematics Engineer-
ing (DTE). This is an introductory course of computer 
security and thus it has a wide scope. Nevertheless, it has 
the goal of providing the students with practical skills. In 
order to achieve this goal, we have extended the tradi-
tional LBL model with the following teaching activities, 
made possible by NETinVM: demos, exercises and labs. 
Demos, are practical explanations where the teacher per-
forms and discusses the activity with the students in a 
lecture session. This kind of activity provides the stu-
dents with deeper insights and it fosters their participa-
tion. NETinVM allows the students to reproduce later 
the same activities or even test new cases. Exercises con-
sist of practical assignments involving several hosts and 
networks that students must do autonomously. By using 
NETinVM, these activities can be securely performed 
in a realistic and reproducible scenario. Finally, labs are 
guided sessions where complex exercises are performed 
by the students under the teacher supervision. NET-
inVM allows the students to complement the guided 
session with further optional work. A representative 
example of a demo could be using Snort as a NIDS. This 
demo consists of running the Snort intrusion detection 
software (Snor_team 2014), and showing how alerts are 
generated when suspicious activities are detected. The 
examples used were scanning the network with Nmap, 
connecting as administrator to a remote SQL database, 
and asking the DNS server for a zone transfer. While 
performing these activities, the network traffic was cap-
tured with Wireshark and the results were discussed 
with the students. An example of exercise carried out in 
the classroom is understanding security alerts. Two CVE 
alerts were selected, and the students were asked to test 
if “base” or the UML machines were vulnerable, and if 
there was an exploit that worked against them. Finally, 
a representative example of labs is firewall configura-
tion. Using Linux Iptables, the lab goes from configur-
ing a single machine (personal firewall) to configuring 
a machine which is responsible for the interconnection 
and filtering of the three NETinVM networks, thus pro-
viding a real case scenario. The lab includes both basic 
static rules and more advanced possibilities as packet 
logging or stateful rules.
Next, we describe some representative examples of 
these teaching activities carried out during the 2013–
2014 year. Two of the demos performed were the follow-
ing ones:
  • Public key cryptography in SSH for server authenti-
cation In this demo, an initial connection to a SSH 
server is started. Since the server’s public key is not 
present in the client’s known hosts file, a confirma-
tion message appears. The importance of answering 
this question is discussed with the students, high-
lighting that this verification is the only protection 
against man-in-the-middle attacks.
  • Using Snort as a NIDS This demo consists of running 
the Snort intrusion detection software (Snor_team 
2014), and showing how alerts are generated when 
suspicious activities are detected. The examples used 
were scanning the network with Nmap, connecting 
as administrator to a remote SQL database, and ask-
ing the DNS server for a zone transfer. While per-
forming these activities, the network traffic was cap-
tured with Wireshark and the results were discussed 
with the students.
Two examples of the exercises proposed were the fol-
lowing ones:
  • Understanding security alerts Two CVE alerts were 
selected, and the students were asked to test if “base” 
or the UML machines were vulnerable, and if there 
was an exploit that worked against them.
  • Analysis of Snort rules Students were asked to per-
form two kinds of remote access to a database. Each 
access should trigger a snort alert. They had to cap-
ture network activity, correlate the information in the 
captured packets with the corresponding snort rule, 
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and justify why the alert was or was not generated, 
depending on the case. This exercise is an extension 
of the second example demo explained above. In this 
way, once the session in the classroom finishes, the 
students can not only reproduce the demo by their 
own, but they can also extend that demo through this 
exercise.
Finally, these are two examples of the labs carried out:
  • Firewall configuration Using Linux Iptables, the lab 
goes from configuring a single machine (personal 
firewall) to configuring a machine which is respon-
sible for the interconnection and filtering of the three 
NETinVM networks, thus providing a real case sce-
nario. The lab includes both basic static rules and 
more advanced possibilities as packet logging or 
stateful rules.
  • Forensic analysis Students are challenged to use The 
Sleuth Kit (TSK) and Autopsy tools (Carrier 2014) to 
construct a time line and retrieve information from 
a file system image of a hacked UML machine. They 
have previously learned to obtain file system images 
in a demo in the classroom. Similarly, another demos 
have been performed to introduce them to the TSK 
and Autopsy tools. The challenge includes finding a 
binary trojan, recovering deleted files related to mali-
cious activity, and finding hidden information in the 
file system.
It must be noticed that NETinVM permits to eas-
ily modify a given activity to become a different kind of 
activity in a different year. This is possible because the 
same platform (NETinVM) is used for all three kind of 
activities, and this platform is available for the students 
anywhere and anytime. For example, it is easy to change 
one demo into one or more autonomous exercises. Also, 
it is easy to convert a lab session into a set of demos or 
exercises.
We have qualitatively and quantitatively evaluated the 
approach followed in this course. The quantitative eval-
uation comes from numeric evaluations of the course 
carried out by the students as part of the University 
of Valencia’s quality assessment protocol. This proto-
col includes anonymous annual surveys with questions 
regarding different aspects of the teaching-learning pro-
cess. The most significant one for our work is the evalu-
ation of the methodology, but we have also included the 
global average for the course, since it is a global assess-
ment of both the NETinVM tool and its use throughout 
the course. Numeric values can be between 0 and 5, with 
a mark of 5 being the best possible score. Table 1 shows 
the quantitative evaluation of the course made by the stu-
dents. The first row in this table shows the specific results 
for the methodology followed in the security course, and 
the second one shows the general results for the course. 
The first (most-left) column shows the results for the 
security course in the Degree in Computer Engineer-
ing, and for comparison purposes the second column 
shows the average values obtained in all the courses of 
this Degree. The two next columns show the analog val-
ues for the Degree in Telematics Engineering, and the 
last column, labelled as “Univ.”, shows the average values 
obtained by all the courses taught in the University of 
Valencia. This table shows that the marks obtained by the 
security course in both degrees are significantly higher 
than the average values of their degrees and the Univer-
sity. These values clearly show that the students greatly 
appreciate the approach followed by the course, that 
NETinVM has made possible.
In order to complement this evaluation, we have used 
a reduced version of the Critical Incident Question-
naire, proposed by Brookfield (2014a). We have asked 
the students to write down the best and the worst things 
about the course. Although they were not specifically 
asked about the utilization of NETinVM, their comments 
clearly show that they appreciate the practical approach 
made possible by this tool. Effectively, the most repeated 
positive opinions were (in descending order) the follow-
ing ones: excellent demos; up to date and interesting 
content; agile and enjoyable classes; excellent laboratory 
assignments, and Lab assignments closely related to the-
oretical contents.
These comments clearly show that using NETinVM 
throughout the course, and the practical activities that 
can thus be added to the traditional LBL, are greatly 
appreciated by the students.
Problem based learning in a network planning course
Problem-based learning (PBL) (Barrows and Tamblyn 
1980; Savery 2006) is a teaching methodology where 
the student’s learning process relies on a problem (con-
structed by the teacher or other students) similar to 
those problems that the student will face in real life. The 
teacher is limited to be a “coach” or a moderator, instead 
of the source of knowledge, while the students should 
collaboratively solve the problem through cooperative 
Table 1 Students course evaluation
Data from University of Valencia’s quality assessment protocol
Security (DCE) DCE Security (DTE) DTE Univ.
Methodology 4.49 3.63 4.04 3.74 3.88
Course average 4.48 3.52 4.08 3.67 3.83
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learning. PBL methodology was applied in the context of 
a network planning course in the Engineering School, at 
University of Valencia. This is a mandatory course sched-
uled in the fourth year of the Degree of Telematics Engi-
neering. The course focuses on network planning and 
management, including saturation and bottleneck detec-
tion. Concretely, NETinVM has been used to design a lab 
session where practical ways of detecting network satura-
tion should be learned through PBL methodology.
The problem is set up as a team contest for winning the 
Best Hacker and the Best Administrator Awards. Each 
team should design and implement a secret procedure 
that tries to saturate the NETinVM networks. The only 
rule is that the saturation procedure must not require to 
become root in any of the NETinVM hosts. As a previ-
ous work to the lab session (prior to the contest), each 
team should design, implement and try as many different 
procedures they want in order to saturate the networks 
in NETinVM, and they can demand help to the teacher 
to guide the process. Prior to the start of the contest, 
each team should privately present the teacher (the sat-
uration procedure is secret for the rest of the teams) a 
written report describing the final procedure they have 
implemented. The awards are based on a single real-time 
competition that takes place in one or more lab sessions, 
with as many rounds as participating teams. When it is 
the turn for each team, that teams becomes the hacker 
in that round, and the team components should imple-
ment the saturation procedure designed by that team in 
the NETinVM copies of the rest of the teams. The rest of 
the teams act as administrators in that round, and they 
should detect the source node (the NETinVM host) and 
the program(s) causing the network saturation as soon as 
possible, within maximum time of 20  min. Any errone-
ous detection is “punished” with the rating of that team 
as the last one in that round. All the rounds are timed, 
starting when every team (except the one acting as the 
hacker) has its NETinVM network saturated, and finish-
ing either when all the teams have found the origin of the 
network saturation, or when 20  min have passed. After 
the contest, there is a round table discussion where all 
the teams present their saturation procedure to the rest 
of the teams, as well as the strategy and commands/pro-
grams used for detecting the origin of the saturation. 
Since the exercise has not a limited number of solutions, 
the validity, advantages and disadvantages of each pro-
posal are discussed. The teams are marked in each round 
as both administrators and hackers. As administrators, 
the teams are marked according to the time required for 
finding the cause of the network saturation (in inverse 
order). As hackers, they are marked according to the time 
took by the first team that discovered the origin of the 
saturation (the longer time, the higher they are marked). 
The aggregated marks for all the rounds will determine 
the final team rankings for both contests, being the win-
ner of each contest the team heading the ranking. The 
participation in the contests ensures a minimum mark, 
but the position in each ranking determines the mark as 
each of the roles. The final mark obtained by each team is 
the in the average value of the mark obtained in the two 
contests. The prize for each contest winner is some addi-
tional mark, ranging in 0.5 and 1 points out of 10.
The final resolution activity took two lab sessions (there 
were five teams, each one composed of four members), 
and the students reported an average dedication of 5  h 
per team member to the particular problem resolution, 
including team meetings (80  % of time) and individual 
work (20 %). All the groups showed great interest in the 
activity, and they developed sophisticated problem solu-
tions showing a deep knowledge of Linux and network 
fundamentals. No erroneous detections happened in the 
contest, and one team achieved that the rest of the teams 
except one exceeded the maximum time to find the ori-
gin of the saturation.
The feasibility of the proposed PBL activity fully relies 
on NETinVM, since the saturation of any network should 
significantly affect the actual network infrastructure. 
Therefore, we asked the students to evaluate the activ-
ity, instead of the tool. Concretely, we made an anony-
mous survey, asking the students (grouped by teams) to 
evaluate the proposed activity in regard to standard lab 
sessions where students should perform practical exer-
cises following the guide notes provided by the teacher. 
A mark of 5 out of 10 corresponds to an evaluation where 
the students equally value both kinds of lab sessions, a 
mark of 0 means that they absolutely prefer the standard 
lab sessions, and a mark of 10 means that they definitely 
prefer the activity based on PBL methodology. We also 
asked to report the main feature(s) of the activity that 
they liked the best. Table 2 shows the results of the sur-
vey. This table shows that the students significantly prefer 
the proposed activity. Also, they valued the freedom for 
designing any feasible solution and the format of contest 
among the existing teams as the best two aspects of the 
activity (in that order). The first aspect would not be pos-
sible without the use of NETinVM, since it provides the 
students with a virtual copy of real networks and hosts, 
allowing them to test any solution. Therefore, these 
Table 2 Evaluation of  the activity provided by  the stu-
dents
Teams Avg.
1 2 3 4 5
Marks 8.0 9.0 7.0 8.5 8.0 8.1
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results validate NETinVM as a valuable tool for activities 
based on PBL methodology.
Using NETinVM for teaching enterprise web applications 
development
Enterprise web applications are built by integrating spe-
cialized components (web servers, application servers, 
database management systems, ...) connected via net-
works. At postgraduate level, students must be able to 
develop skills in integrating all of these components in 
real-world scenarios. This is the case of the Master in 
Systems and Services in the Information Society, where 
a common platform for all the courses of the master was 
desirable. The authors engaged in the project of adapting 
NETinVM to provide a satisfactory teaching and learning 
environment for enterprise web application development, 
including facets such as application development, applica-
tion deployment, server administration and security.
The solution consisted of adapting the standard con-
figuration of NETinVM to suit the specific needs of this 
project. The following changes were performed: Install-
ing and configuring an application server (Glassfish) in 
“dmzc”; installing and configuring MySQL and LDAP in 
“intb”; installing and configuring Eclipse in “base”; Adapt-
ing the rules at “fw” to the new environment. In par-
ticular, the application’s server front-end interface (port 
80) had to be publicly accessible, the application’s server 
administrative interface had to be accessible only from 
selected nodes of the internal network, and the appli-
cations’ server should be able to contact the LDAP and 
MySQL internal server.
This adapted version of NETinVM provided master’s 
students and teachers with a common platform that 
proved to be appropriate to conduct all the practical exer-
cises and demonstrations, with the following advantages 
(Pérez et al. 2011): the students had to learn only a sin-
gle tool (NETinVM) that was shared by different subjects 
in different areas, such as operating system administra-
tion, computer and network security, and web develop-
ment; students were able to develop, deploy and test their 
applications in their own portable environment without 
compromising real systems or networks; students and 
teachers shared a common environment, so classroom 
demonstrations could be reproduced by students; finally, 
using the same tool throughout the master allowed for 
better coordination among teachers of different subjects.
Other uses of NETinVM
The ease of portability and reproducibility of a realistic 
scenario yielded by NETinVM make this virtual machine 
an ideal tool for Massive Open Online Courses (MOOC). 
In this way, it has been used as the platform for a new 
Massive Open Online Course (MOOC) at University 
of Valencia (Pérez 2016). In this open course, the net-
works and virtual machines included in NETinVM are 
used for providing each student with its own virtual lab 
where practical network and security exercises can be 
performed.
Nevertheless, NETinVM has been successfully used in 
other scenarios by people not related to the University 
of Valencia. Effectively, in the book “CASP: CompTIA® 
Advanced Security Practitioner, Study Guide”, by Gregg 
(2012), the author uses NETinVM in 11 out of 20 labs. 
These labs provide a hands-on approach necessary to 
fully understand the concepts introduced in the book, 
which is preparatory to the “CompTIA® Advanced Secu-
rity Practitioner” exam (Brookfield 2014b). NETinVM is 
used for labs such as port scanning, network traffic analy-
sis, web vulnerability assessment, system auditing, net-
work intrusion detection, or rootkit detection.
Another example of use is the paper titled “Using 
OSSEC with NETinVM” (Allen 2010), submitted by 
Jon Mark Allen as part of the GIAC (GCIH) Gold Cer-
tification from the SANS Institute (2014). This paper, 
presented in September 17, 2010, uses NETinVM as an 
appropriate virtual scenario for installing and custom-
izing the host-based intrusion detection system OSSEC 
(2014). Using NETinVM allowed the author to configure 
OSSEC to comply with a security policy. In addition, it 
also made possible launching attacks, checking that alerts 
were effectively generated, and seeing how OSSEC auto-
matically responded to the attacks.
Finally, NETinVM has also been adapted to suit more 
specific requirements. This is the case of the “Lab in a 
box” of the PenTestlaboratory, where NETinVM was 
modified to build a virtual laboratory for penetration test-
ing courses (PenTestlaboratory 2014). In this set up, UML 
machines where specifically configured to be vulnerable, 
in order to become potential targets of pentesters.
Conclusions
This paper has proposed NETinVM, a tool based on 
nested virtualization that includes a fully functional lab 
in a single virtual machine. Also, it has analyzed and eval-
uated how it has been used in different environments. 
The results show that this tool makes it possible to per-
form demos, labs and practical exercises, greatly appreci-
ated by the students, that would otherwise be unfeasible. 
In addition, it allows to reproduce the results of the pro-
posed exercises, providing portability and allowing the 
students to work autonomously. Also, NETinVM has 
been adapted to suit other scenarios, such as enterprise 
web application development or penetration testing.
As a future work, the authors plan to add support for 
controlled remote access, thus allowing the instructor to 
provide students with remote assistance.
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Availability and requirements
  • Project name: NETinVM
  • Project home page: http://www.netinvm.org
  • Hardware requirements:
• Processor with hardware support for virtualization
•  4 GB RAM
•  20 GB of available hard disk space
  • Software requirements:
• VMware Player, VMware Workstation or Virtual-
box
•  Operating system(s): Any of the OS on which 
VMware or Virtualbox works.
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